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Potential Liability of New Employers to
Pre-Existing Collective Bargaining
Agreements and Pre-Existing Unions:
A Comparison of Labor Law
Successorship Doctrines in the
United States and Canada
Phillip M. Schreiber
I. INTRODUCTION
Successorship questions arise in many areas of corporate law when
one business entity takes over another business entity. In labor law, suc-
cessorship issues can arise whenever one business entity takes over an-
other business entity which has employees that are collectively
organized. Similar successorship issues in labor law exist in both the
United States and Canada. However, both the determination of succes-
sor status and the consequences of this determination differ in the United
States and Canada. In addition, differences exist within the various Cana-
dian provinces and federal territories. This comment will explore and
analyze these differences. ,
Beyond a simple comparison, this comment will take the perspective
of the management of a foreign multinational corporation (MNC) seek-
ing access to North America by taking over a pre-existing entity. ' The
1 Instead of the massive capital and time expenditure needed for the MNC to build its own
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foreign MNC would be likely to consider its obligations to honor any
pre-existing collective bargaining agreements, to bargain with the pre-
existing union, and to abide by an arbitration clause in a pre-existing
collective bargaining agreement. Such information would be important
to MNCs desiring to take over an ailing company with the idea of mak-
ing major structural and/or personnel changes. If the MNC is bound to
honor the previous agreement, it will be restrained from making these
needed changes and the transaction would be futile. The relevant juris-
diction's successorship doctrine determines the extent of these obliga-
tions and, therefore, the ability of the MNC to make these necessary
changes. Analysis of the labor law successorship doctrines of the United
States and Canada indicates that U.S. successorship doctrine is more
flexible than Canadian successorship doctrine and thus more advanta-
geous to foreign MNCs. Foreign MNCs would therefore be well advised
to seek takeover opportunities in the United States rather than in
Canada.
Part II of this comment will provide a brief overview of the Cana-
dian labor law system. Part III will analyze the common law develop-
ment of labor law successorship doctrine in the United States. Part IV
will discuss Canadian labor law successorship doctrine in general. Part
V will analyze in detail the tests for successorship in the United States.
Part VI will discuss the successorship tests used by the various Canadian
provinces and territories. Part VII will compare these tests to those used
in the United States, and will make a normative judgment as to which
system is more advantageous to the management of foreign MNCs. Fi-
nally, part VIII will provide an illustration of why the U.S. system is
superior.
II. THE CANADIAN LABOR LAW SYSTEM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
2
The Canadian labor law system draws heavily upon the labor law
system of the United States. Like workers in the United States, Cana-
dian workers possess a "statutorily protected right to organize for collec-
tive bargaining." 3 Once workers organize, the employer has to "bargain
in good faith" with the aim of obtaining a collective bargaining agree-
plant, the MNC might choose to take over an existing plant through an asset purchase or stock
transfer.
2 It is assumed that most readers are not familiar with the Canadian labor~aw system but are
familiar with the U.S. labor law system. This section is meant to provide the reader with a brief
overview of the Canadian system in order to provide a better understanding of the more detailed
discussion of Canadian labor law successorship doctrine in Parts III and V.
3 H.W. ARTHURS, D.D. CARTER, J. FUDGE, & H.J GLASBEEK, LABOUR LAW AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 33 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter H.W. ARTHURs].
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ment. If no agreement can be reached through negotiation, the repre-
sented workers can strike to press their position. Likewise, the employer
may initiate a lockout to press its position.4
Two aspects of Canadian labor statutes differ from their U.S. coun-
terparts. First, workers cannot strike while a collective bargaining agree-
ment is in force. Instead, arbitration resolves disputes and grievances.
Furthermore, strikes can occur when no collective bargaining agreement
exists only after alternative paths to resolution have been exhausted.
These unique aspects of the Canadian system are designed to minimize
industrial conflict.5
About thirty-three percent of non-agricultural workers in Canada
belong to a union.6 Union membership is concentrated in specific indus-
tries. Traditionally, unionized industries include "mining, construction,
petro-chemical, transport and communications, steel, and manufactur-
ing.... ."I With the exception of governmental employees, unions enjoy
little success in organizing the service-oriented, white-collar sector of the
labor market.'
The Canadian Constitution has an impact on Canadian labor law.
Specifically, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms9 affects many
areas of Canadian labor law. Some areas potentially affected include ex-
clusive representation, various union security agreements (i.e., union-
shop agreements), regulation of strike activity, and regulation of both
employer and employee free speech. 10 Successorship issues, however, do
not appear to be an area subject to constitutional scrutiny.
In contrast to the United States, where labor statutes are almost
exclusively at the federal level, in Canada, each province has its own
labor statute. The federal statutes in Canada affect only the territories,
not the provinces.11 Nevertheless, because each of the statutes, excluding
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 31.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Part I of the Constitution Act, included as Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
10 G. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOUR LAW 144 (1985).
11 H.W. ARTHURS, supra note 3, at 28. The following is a complete list of the Canadian labor
statutes:
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, ch. L-I, as amended R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.) ch.
22; R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.) ch. 17.
Alberta Labour Relations Act, Alta. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. L-1.
British Columbia Industrial Relations Act, B.C. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 212.
Manitoba Labour Relations Act, C.C.S.M., ch. L-10.
New Brunswick Industrial Relations, N.B. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 1-4.
Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, Nfld. Stat. 1977. ch. 64.
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Saskatchewan's, were "founded upon the Dominion wartime regulations,
P.C. 1003 .... labour legislation across the country is ...broadly
similar.'
12
With respect to private-sector collective bargaining, there is a great
deal of similarity in Canada's labor statutes. First, every statute provides
for a "process of certification, a duty to bargain in good faith, procedures
for dispute resolution and for termination of bargaining rights."13 Fur-
thermore, every statute contains "provisions dealing with successor
rights" and successor unfair labor practices. 4 Although the statutes in
each jurisdiction are not identical, they do reflect a common tendency to
favor employees of the predecessor business and their unions.15
Each province as well as the federal government has a special adju-
dicatory body to administer their respective labor statutes. Except for
Quebec, each jurisdiction has a labor board established by statute to en-
force and administer that jurisdiction's labor laws. Quebec has a Labour
Court which performs these functions. The labor board in British Co-
lumbia enjoys the broadest range of powers. These powers include au-
thority over "conciliation, strikes, picketing and grievance arbitration,
inter alia." Labor boards in other jurisdictions possess only some of
these powers.1
6
Beyond regulatory authority, Canadian labor boards also possess
similar remedial powers. Boards can order an employer to remedy its
unfair labor practices by reinstating employees, paying compensation,
setting aside any disciplinary action taken, and issuing orders to cease
and desist from the unlawful action. In addition, boards can order un-
ions to take similar corrective action.1
7
Labor boards in Canada are subject to judicial review in only limited
circumstances. Generally, the only grounds for seeking judicial review of
a board's final decision are a "[d]efect of jurisdiction; [a] [d]enial of natu-
ral justice; [an] [e]rror of law on the face of the record; and [flraud or
collusion."'" These four grounds notwithstanding, a board's findings of
Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, N.S. Stat. 1972, ch. 19.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. 1980, ch. 228.
Prince Edward Island Labour Act, P.E.I. Rev. Stat. 1974, ch. L-1.
Quebec Labour Code, Que. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. C-27.
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, Sask. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. T-17.
12 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 91.
13 Id. at 99.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 H.W. ARTHURs, supra note 3, at 57.
17 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 99.
18 Id. at 159.
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fact and law are "final and binding on the parties."' 19
Iii. LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP DocTRINE IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. General Overview
It is difficult to determine a precise definition of the term "successor-
ship."20 Generally, the concept of successorship involves the situation
where an employer acquiring a business inherits certain labor obligations
from the predecessor. The problem in forming a more concise definition
of "successorship" results from the multitude of different business trans-
actions from which successorship issues can arise. Such transactions can
range from stock transfers to asset purchases to the assumption of a ser-
vice contract, in addition to many other types of transactions. 2'
The range of successor obligations is as broad as the types of busi-
ness transactions that give rise to the issue in the first place. Being la-
beled a successor can obligate an employer to bargain with the pre-
existing union, abide by the predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment, arbitrate, and remedy the predecessor's unfair labor practices.22
As will become apparent, an employer may be labeled a successor for
certain purposes and not for others.23
In the United States, labor law successorship doctrine has developed
through judge-made common law. Consequently, the labor statutes
themselves fail to provide a test to determine whether a new employer is
a successor and, if so, the effect of that label. However, successorship
issues do arise in light of two major labor statutes. Successor questions
arise under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)24 if
the union or individual employees seek to compel the new employer to
arbitrate. In addition, successor questions arise under § 8(a) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)21 if the pre-existing union seeks to
compel the employer to bargain with that union. The precise role of
these statutes in successorship doctrine will be discussed in Part V.
It should be noted that many employment contracts contain boiler-
plate "successor and assigns" clauses. Despite their intent, such clauses
19 Id.
20 George, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 277 (1988).
21 Id. at 277-78.
22 Id. at 278.
23 Id. Thus, an employer may be forced to bargain with the pre-existing union but will not be
required to adhere to the previous collective bargaining agreement.
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1982).
25 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1982).
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alone do not bind a new employer to the previous collective agreement.26
Thus, such clauses have no effect on the resolution of successorship ques-
tions. Instead, such questions have been resolved by a series of Supreme
Court cases.
B. Major Supreme Court Successorship Cases
The following discussion of the key Supreme Court cases dealing
with successorship illustrates that this entire area of labor law is derived
from judge-made common law. Furthermore, this survey will provide a
historical context to the general development of U.S. labor law successor-
ship doctrine. The detailed rules on successorship will be discussed in
Part V of this comment.
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston27 (Wiley) was the first successor-
ship case decided by the Supreme Court that focused on the issue of suc-
cessorship and not the remedial powers of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB).28 Wiley involved a suit under § 301 of the LMRA29 to
arbitrate under the terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement.
In Wiley, the predecessor employer, Interscience Publishers, had a
collective bargaining agreement with a union. The agreement contained a
clause that called for arbitration of any grievances or disputes arising out
of, or in the course of, the agreement. There was no "successor and as-
signs" clause in the agreement. Eventually, Interscience merged with
Wiley during the lifetime of the Interscience collective bargaining agree-
ment. Wiley refused to recognize the Interscience union. The union then
filed suit under § 301 to compel Wiley to arbitrate five issues which arose
under the Interscience agreement. The union was seeking to arbitrate
only on behalf of the employees who originally worked for Interscience.30
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that despite the merger, Wi-
ley had an obligation to arbitrate grievances and disputes which arose
26 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, GOVERNMENT PROTECTION OF EMPLOY-
EES INVOLVED IN MERGERS AND AcQuisITIONs 341-42 (1989); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit
Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974) (If the new employer clearly refused to assume any
obligations that arose under the old CBA, the existence of a successorship clause in the old CBA
imposes no binding effect on the new employer).
27 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
28 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 201. The Board's reme-
dial powers include the power to force an employer or a union to pay compensation for the damage
it unlawfully caused.
29 § 301 of the LMRA provides, inter alia, a means for individual employees to enforce their
collective bargaining contract rights (including the right to arbitration) by bringing suit in federal or
state court.
30 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 202.
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under the Interscience collective bargaining agreement.31 The Court
stated that "the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the union does
not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the
agreement, and... in appropriate circumstances, present here, the suc-
cessor employer may be required to arbitrate under the agreement."32 In
other words, an arbitration clause contained in a predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement may still have effect even though the business en-
tity was taken over by another business entity.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc. 33 (Burns) was the second
major Supreme Court successorship case and is "the most important case
for corporate planners."34 Here the Supreme Court undertook a succes-
sorship case that did not involve a transfer of assets or capital.35 In this
case the predecessor employer (Wackenhut) provided plant security serv-
ices for a third party (Lockheed). The predecessor employer's workers
were represented by the United Plant Guard Workers of America. After
the predecessor and the union executed a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the new employer (Bums) replaced the predecessor. The new em-
ployer retained twenty-seven of the predecessor employer's workers and
brought in fifteen of its own workers.36 Shortly before the new employer
took over, it recognized a rival union as the representative of all employ-
ees in the work unit.3 7
Soon after the new employer (Burns) took over, it rejected a demand
for recognition from the predecessor's union (under Wackenhut). In ad-
dition, Bums rejected the Wackenhut union's demand that Burns honor
the Wackenhut collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court
held that Burns was a successor and, therefore, obligated to bargain with
the union. However, Bums had no obligation to adopt the previous col-
lective bargaining agreement.38 Thus, in contrast to the holding of the
NLRB, the Court chose not to require the successor employer to auto-
31 Id. at 203.
32 376 U.S. at 548.
33 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
34 Fasman & Fischler, Labor Relations Consequences of Mergers and Acquisitions, 13 Employee
Rel. L.J. 14, 16 (1986). Burns provides the basic test for successorship in § 8(a) duty to bargain
suits. This will determine if the new employer has to recognize and bargain with the pre-existing
union.
35 George, supra note 20, at 282. Rather than involving an asset or capital transfer, Burns in-
volved the assumption of a service contract.
36 Thus a majority of the new work unit came from the predecessor employer.
37 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 205.
38 Id. at 205-06.
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matically adopt the terms of the previous collective bargaining
agreement.
The Court upheld the finding that Burns was a successor for two
reasons. First, there was little structural change in the operations or
practices of Burns as compared to Wackenhut. Second, and more impor-
tantly, a majority of the employees in the new work unit were from the
predecessor employer.3 9
Although the Court ruled that a successor employer may be bound
to bargain with the predecessor's union, it flatly rejected any notion that
the new employer was strictly bound by the previous collective bargain-
ing agreement.4 First, the Court held that binding a successor to a pre-
vious agreement runs counter to "the 'fundamental' policy of freedom of
contract. ' 4 1 The Court offered a second and more compelling reason
from a public policy perspective. This reason concerned the mobility of
capital. The Court stated:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only
if [it] can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor
force, work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling
such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained
in the old collective bargaining contract may make these changes impossi-
ble and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital.42
Thus, the Court exhibited concern that a troubled business entity might
fail due to the unwillingness of potential purchasers to take it over be-
cause they would be unable to make the necessary structural changes.
The Burns and Wiley holdings appear to be in conflict.43 The appar-
ent incompatibility of Burns and Wiley resulted from the Court proceed-
ing from "antithetical premises."'  In Wiley, the Court was concerned
with protecting the "rights of employees who might have lost benefits
through no fault of their own."'4 5 In Burns, the Court was concerned
with "preserving the employer's right to restructure a business, thus en-
hancing the attractiveness of a transfer of ownership."' The latter con-
cern is the motivating force behind recent NLRB and court decisions.47
39 406 U.S. at 280-81.
40 H. NoRTHRup, P. MiscRnIARRA, & R. TuRNER, supra note 26, at 207 (citing Burns, 406
U.S. at 284).
41 Id.
42 406 U.S. at 287-88.
43 Wiley required the honoring of an arbitration clause in the previous agreement while Burns
did not require the adoption of any of the previous agreements provisions.
44 Fasman & Fischler, supra note 34, at 18.
45 Id.
46Id.
47 Id. at 19. Thus, the Wiley decision is no longer considered good law.
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Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd.48 (Howard
Johnson) was the fourth49 major Supreme Court case dealing with suc-
cessorship. Like Wiley, this case involved a § 301 suit to compel arbitra-
tion. In this case, the predecessor employer was a party to a collective
bargaining agreement containing a "successor and assigns" clause. How-
ard Johnson agreed to take over the business but explicitly stated that it
would not assume any prior collective bargaining agreements. When
Howard Johnson took over the business it operated with fifty-five em-
ployees. However, only nine of those employees worked under the previ-
ous employer.50 The predecessor's union filed suit seeking to compel
arbitration and to force Howard Johnson to rehire the predecessor's
employees.5 1
The Supreme Court ruled that Howard Johnson was not a successor
and therefore had no obligation to arbitrate under the prior collective
bargaining agreement.5 2 The significance of Howard Johnson lies in the
Court's discussion of the continuity of the workforce requirement. The
Court viewed the continuity of the workforce as vital to the continuity of
identity in the business enterprise. Howard Johnson (and any other new
employer) is free to hire or not hire anybody it wants. Thus, a new em-
ployer can escape successor status under § 301 cases by not hiring a ma-
jority of the predecessor's workforce.53
In Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB 54 (Fall River Dye-
ing), the Supreme Court took up the successorship issue for the first
time in thirteen years. In this case the union-organized predecessor em-
ployer closed down after almost thirty years of operation. Seven months
after purchasing most of the predecessor's assets, Fall River Dyeing initi-
ated start-up procedures. During the first two months of operation, Fall
River Dyeing hired one shift of fifty-five employees.55 During the next
three months of operation a second shift was added for a total of 107
48 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
49 Prior to Howard Johnson, the Court decided Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S.
168 (1973), affirming 467 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1972), enforcing 187 NLRB 1017 (1971). This case dealt
with whether a NLRB remedial order could be applied to a successor. The Court held that it was
permissible for the NLRB to impose its remedial order on a successor employer.
50 417 U.S. at 252. Thus, a majority of the predecessor's employees were not employed by the
new employer. Furthermore, a majority of the employees from the new work unit did not come
from the predecessor employer.
51 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 209.
52 Id. at 210.
53 George, supra note 20, at 286. However, a new employer can not discriminate in its hiring
decisions on the basis of whether an individual worked for the predecessor or not. Id.
54 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
55 Id. at 33.
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employees. 56 Although the predecessor's employees made up only a mi-
nority of the expanded 107 person unit, they constituted a majority of the
initial fifty-five person unit.5 7 The main issue in this case concerned the
appropriate time to measure for majority status - after the initial shift
was hired or after the second shift was added. 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the "substantial and representative
complement" rule established by the NLRB to determine when to mea-
sure for majority status.5 9 Under this rule, the appropriate time to deter-
mine if the majority requirement has been met is when a substantial and
representative complement of the employees has been hired, not when
the full complement of employees has been hired.' Furthermore, the
Court also clarified its requirement that there be a continuity in the char-
acter of the enterprise. The Court stated that in making a determination
of whether such continuity exists, the question must be viewed from the
perspective of the employees.61 Thus, if a new employer makes changes
only in areas that do not affect the unionized employees, continuity in the
character of the enterprise still exists. As far as the unionized employees
are concerned, nothing has changed from their perspective. 2
The preceding paragraphs trace the major developments of succes-
sorship doctrine in the United States. The above cases developed the
rules used by the NLRB and appellate courts for determining successor-
ship status under suits to compel bargaining (§ 8(a) of the NLRA) and
suits to compel arbitration (§ 301 of the LMRA). It is apparent that
successorship doctrine in the United States is a product of judge-made
common law.
IV. CANADIAN LABOR LAW SUCCESSORSHIP DOCTRINE
In contrast to the common law development of successorship doc-
trine in the United States, the Canadian law of successorship is statutory
in nature. The various Canadian statutes are constantly changing to
"dress up the law of succession" and refine legal problems such as the
"distinction between the sale of a business as a going concern and the sale
of the assets of a business ....6
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 George, supra note 20, at 280.
59 Fasman & Fischler, supra note 34, at 31-32.
60 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 219.
61 Fasman & Fischler, supra note 34, at 22.
62 Contrast this with changes in production or supervision where the unionized employees would
be affected by the change.
63 A.W.R. CARROTHERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW IN CANADA 74-75 (2d ed. 1986).
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A. Transfer Types and Successorship
A variety of transfers can lead to labeling a new employer as a suc-
cessor. For example, multiparty transactions that involve agents or in-
termediary purchasers do not prevent the final new employer from being
labeled a successor. If such transactions could circumvent successor sta-
tus, most transactions would be framed in such a manner. This would be
contrary to the intent of the legislatures."
Mergers, however, may be a different story. British Columbia, for
example, differentiates between mergers and sales. In that jurisdiction,
when two companies merge into a partnership, neither company is bound
to any pre-existing collective bargaining agreements. Other jurisdictions
do not make such a distinction and hold that mergers are to be treated
like any other sale.65
Nevertheless, there must be a new owner regardless of the transac-
tion type (merger or sale). "A mere change in name of an employer with-
out a change in ownership or the nature of the operation does not affect
the bargaining relationship."66 Thus, sham transactions executed merely
to eliminate any obligations to the union or employees will fail.
B. Successor Obligations When A Collective Bargaining Agreement
Does and Does Not Exist
When a new employer is labeled a successor, its obligations will de-
pend on whether a collective bargaining agreement is in effect. When a
collective bargaining agreement is in effect, the new employer must
honor that agreement until the appropriate labor board decides other-
wise. On the other hand, when no collective bargaining agreement is
operating at the time of the transfer, the new employer is only obligated
to bargain with the pre-existing union. However, the union must request
the new employer to bargain, and the two parties bargain from a clean
slate. In other words, during the bargaining process, the new employer is
not bound to anything agreed to by the predecessor.6
V. TESTS FOR SUCCESSOR STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES
This section will discuss the tests used by the NLRB and the federal
This implies that the various labor tribunals do not take it upon themselves to make necessary inter-
pretations of the labor statutes. This is an example of how the provincial and national legislatures
dominate the realm of labor relations in Canada.
64 Id. at 420-21.
65 Id. at 420.
66 Id. at 418.
67 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 399.
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courts in the United States to determine successor status. In the United
States, the type of transaction used to transfer a business or its assets is
significant in determining the type of test applied to determine successor
status. In addition, the type of suit brought (§ 8(a) of the NLRA or
§ 301 of the LMRA) will also affect the type of test used to determine
successor status.
A. Tests For Successorship: The Asset Purchase
The tests for successorship following an asset purchase, under both
§ 8(a) suits to compel bargaining and § 301 suits to compel arbitration,
can be divided into two prongs. The first prong is the test for continuity
of the workforce. The second prong is the test for continuity in the iden-
tity of the character of the enterprise.
1. Continuity of the Workforce
a. Majority Required Under § 8(a) Suits to Compel Bargaining With
the Pre-existing Union
The workforce continuity test for cases arising under § 8(a)
originated in Burns." Although the Court's ruling in Burns was ambigu-
ous, succeeding tribunals (the NLRB and the appellate courts) inter-
preted the rule to mean that where a majority of the new employer's
workforce was employed by the predecessor employer, there would be
continuity of the workforce for the purpose of § 8(a) duty-to-bargain
cases.69 Thus, if more than fifty-percent of the new employer's workforce
came from the predecessor employer, the majority test is met.
b. Majority Required Under § 301 Suits to Compel Arbitration
Under the Prior Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Court in Howard Johnson approved lower court interpretations
of Wiley which required a majority of the predecessor's employees to be
hired by the new employer in order to establish the needed majority.
70
"The focus on the proportion of predecessor employees that have been
retained... bears a reasonable relation to the workforce whose rights the
union, by requesting arbitration, seeks to protect in Wiley arbitration
68 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
69 Spruce-Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194 (1974), enf'd, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1975); Contract Car-
ier, Inc., 258 NLRB 353 (1981); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976), cert denied,
419 U.S. 921 (1976); and Saks and Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1980).
70 417 U.S. at 264. Contrast this with the § 8(a) majority of requiring more than fifty-percent of
the new employer's employees to be from the old employer.
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cases."" t Thus, the Court's endorsement of lower court decisions focus-
ing on whether a new employer hires a majority of the predecessor's em-
ployees leads to a "threshold requirement that a 'majority' of the
predecessor's workforce be retained before a duty to arbitrate will be im-
posed on the [new employer]." '72
The Court in Howard Johnson did not explicitly rule that a new
employer must hire a majority of the predecessor's workforce for there to
be continuity of the workforce.73 Nevertheless, courts uniformly reject
requests for Wiley arbitration where the new employer hires less than a
majority of the predecessor's workforce.74 Thus, if more than fifty-per-
cent of the predecessor's workforce is employed by the new employer, the
new employer has a duty to arbitrate.75
c. When to Measure For the Required Majority: The "Substantial
and Representative Complement" Test and the "Continuing
Demand" Rule
The Supreme Court endorsed the "substantial and representative
complement" rule established by the NLRB in Fall River Dyeing.76 This
rule sets forth five factors to be considered in determining the appropri-
ate time to determine whether the required majority exists. First, the
Board must determine "whether the job classifications designated for the
operation were filled or substantially filled."7 7 Second, the Board must
determine if "the operation was in normal or substantially normal pro-
duction."78 Third, the Board must consider "the size of the complement
on" the date in question.7 9 Fourth, the Board must weigh "the time ex-
pected to elapse before a substantially larger complement would be at
71 H. NORTHRuP, P. MIscIMARRA, & R. TuRNER, supra note 26, at 252-53.
72 Id. at 253.
73 The Court merely gave approval of lower court decisions. Id.
74 H. NORTHRUP, P. MIscRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 255.
75 Because the distinction between the majority tests for § 8(a) and § 301 is subtle, an example
may be helpful. First, assume that a predecessor employer had a 100 person workforce and the new
employer has a 30 person workforce. If 25 of the 30 employees came from the predecessor, then the
majority test for § 8(a) is met because more than fifty-percent of the new employer's workforce came
from the predecessor. However, the majority test for § 301 is not met because a majority of the
predecessor's workforce is not employed by the new employer. Now assume that the predecessor
employer again had a 100 person workforce but the new employer had a 250 person workforce. If 90
of the 250 employees came from the predecessor, the majority test for § 301 is met because more
than fifty-percent of the predecessor's workforce is employed by the new employer. However, the
majority test for § 8(a) is not met because a majority of the new employer's employees did not come
from the predecessor.
76 482 U.S. 27.
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work."8 0 Finally, the Board must consider "the relative certainty of the
employer's expected expansion.""1
In addition to the "substantial and representative complement" rule,
the Court in Fall River Dyeing upheld the NLRB's "continuing demand"
rule. According to the Court, a successor's duty to bargain at the "sub-
stantial and representative complement" date is triggered only when the
union demands to bargain. However, under the "continuing demand"
rule, a union's premature bargaining demand (i.e., made before the sub-
stantial and representative complement date) remains in effect until the
appropriate date is reached.82
d. Prohibition Against Discriminatory Practices to Avoid the
Required Majority
Although a new enterprise is under no obligation to hire employees
from the predecessor, a new employer cannot deny employment to an
individual because they worked for the predecessor.83 A bargaining or-
der will be issued and enforced where, "but for the successor's discrimi-
natory refusal to hire the predecessor's employees, the union would have
represented a majority of the successor's workforce."'8 4 Thus, a new em-
ployer cannot escape successor obligations through discriminatory
methods.
e. Primary Importance of the "Continuity of the Workforce" Test
The workforce majority requirement is the most important determi-
nate of whether a new employer will be labeled a successor. In essence,
"the majority requirement acts as a 'threshold' factor" since the NLRB
will refuse to label a new employer a successor without it.85 This is true
even where virtually every other aspect of the new employer's business is
identical to the predecessor's business.86 In short, the workforce major-
ity requirement is the "prime determinant" of whether a new employer
will be considered a successor. 87 In fact, where the required workforce
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 482 U.S. at 52.
83 See Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
84 A.B.A. Sec. Lab. & Employ. L., The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and the
National Labor Relations Act 366 n.2 (2d ed. Fifth Supp. 1989) [hereinafter The Developing Labor
Law] (citing Hubacher Cadillac, 276 NLRB 1062 (1983), aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1985));
American Press, Inc., 280 NLRB 937 (1986), enfd, 833 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1987). Similar orders
would be issued and enforced in duty-to-arbitrate cases.
85 George, supra note 20, at 287.
86 rd.
87 Fasman & Fisehler, supra note 34, at 30.
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majority exists, the NLRB almost always labels the new employer a
successor.
8 8
2. Continuity in the Identity of the Character of the Enterprise
The second prong of the successorship test for both § 301 and § 8(a)
claims is whether there have been any substantial changes in the charac-
ter of the business enterprise since the asset purchase. If it is found that
no substantial changes exist, there is continuity in the character of the
enterprise and this prong of the successorship test has been met.8 9
There are seven general factors which determine whether there is
continuity of the enterprise. These factors are whether:
(1) there has been a substantial continuity of the same business
operations;
(2) the new employer uses the same plant;
(3) the same or substantially the same workforce is employed;90
(4) the same jobs exist under the same working conditions;
(5) the same supervisors are employed;
(6) the same machinery, equipment and methods of production are used;
and
(7) the same product is manufactured or the same services offered. 9
Compared to the rigidity of the "continuity of the workforce" test,
the "continuity of the character of the business enterprise" test is very
flexible.92 Analysis of the various factors under this prong should be
based on the totality of the circumstances and should be done on a case-
by-case basis.93 Furthermore, not all of the factors need to be met, nor is
one factor always controlling.
94
B. Tests for Successorship: The Stock Transfer
The asset purchase transaction is different from the stock transfer
situation. In TKB Int'l Corp.95 the NLRB discussed these differences.
Where there is an asset purchase situation or a taking over of services
88 George, supra note 20, at 287 n.86.
89 The Developing Labor Law, supra note 84, at 367; H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R.
TURNER, supra note 26, at 256-57; see Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 43.
90 This is the continuity of the workforce prong. It is given special status and is often the con-
trolling factor. The Developing Labor Law, supra note 84, at 369.
91 Id. at 368-369 n.65.
92 George, supra note 20, at 292-93.
93 Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 43.
94 The Developing Labor Law, supra note 84, at 369 (citing Premium Foods, 260 NLRB 708
(1982), enf'd, 709 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1983)). However, recall that the continuity of the workforce is
a separate test that also must be met for a new employer to be labeled a successor.
95 240 NLRB 1082 (1979).
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provided to a third party (like in Burns), one employing entity is substi-
tuted by another employing entity and the old entity either "terminates
its existence or otherwise ceases to have any relationship to the ongoing
operations of the [new entity]." 96 The stock transfer, on the other hand,
"involves no break or hiatus between two legal entities, but is, rather, the





In general, the purchasing enterprise must honor the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 99 Furthermore, the corporation will not be equated
with the identity of its shareholders. Therefore, there will be no succes-
sorship analysis."°° The stock purchaser not only will be bound to bar-
gain with the union, but must also honor the previous collective
bargaining agreement.
2. Two Exceptions
Like many rules of law, there are usually exceptions to the general
rule. In this case there are two. The first exception occurs when the
stock purchaser makes significant structural changes in the enterprise af-
ter the stock transfer takes place.10 1 Such a change might involve com-
plete reallocation of the use of the enterprise's resources. 102 When this
occurs, successorship-like principles take over.1 3 As is the case under
successorship doctrine, the structural change may be so great that there
no longer exists any continuity of the enterprise; therefore, the purchaser
is not even a successor. 10 4
The second exception occurs when the seller misleads the stock pur-
chaser with regard to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement.
In such a case, even though no structural change occurred, the purchaser
96 Id. at 1083 n. 4.
97 Id.
98 The Supreme Court has yet to adopt a rule for these types of cases. See EPE, Inc. v. NLRB,
845 F.2d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 1988). Therefore, any rules stated must be understood with the
knowledge that there may be some variance from circuit to circuit.
99 Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 751 (7th Cir. 1989).
100 Id.
101 EPE Inc., 845 F.2d at 490.
102 Id.
103 Id. Thus, a stock purchaser may be forced to bargain with the union instead of adopting the
previous collective bargaining agreement.
104 Id. (citing Laurer's Furniture Stores, Inc., 246 NLRB 360 (1979)). In this case the stock
purchaser will not even be required to bargain with the pre-existing union.
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will not be bound to the original collective bargaining agreement. 10 5
C. New Employer's Obligation to the Pre-existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement in the Context of an Asset Purchase
Any new employer will have some concern as to whether it will be
obligated under the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement. As ex-
plained above, the Supreme Court in Burns rejected the idea that a duty
to bargain automatically imposes a requirement to adopt the pre-existing
collective bargaining agreement. 10 6 The Court based this rule on § 8(d)
of the NLRA 10 7 and its holding in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB.'l 8
There are times, however, when the successor employer does assume
the pre-existing agreement. Assumption of the pre-existing agreement
can be voluntary or implicit. The NLRB, along with the courts, has ar-
ticulated a number of factors that should be analyzed in determining
whether a successor adopted the pre-existing agreement. 10 9
The strongest case for countering a suggestion of employment con-
tract adoption occurs where the successor explicitly "disavows any as-
sumption of the predecessor's.., agreement and where its actions are
consistent with the disclaimers." 110 A number of cases show "that a fail-
ure to disavow adherence to the predecessor's contract, or a successor's
disclaimer of adoption accompanied or followed by inconsistent conduct,
can result in a finding that" the successor assumed the pre-existing
agreement. ' '
Another factor that can lead to an inference of voluntary assump-
tion is where the successor adheres to the pre-existing contract terms for
a period of time and then changes the terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 12 Although this behavior by itself is not sufficient to establish
voluntary adoption of the contract, such a delay can give an inference of
adoption, especially "absent a disclaimer of any intention of honoring the
105 MPE, Inc., 226 NLRB 519 (1976); Esmark Inc., 887 F.2d at 751 n.20.
106 H. NoRTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 335.
107 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Section 8(d) states that a duty to bargain "does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Id.
108 397 U.S. 99 (1970). The Court ruled that the NLRB could force parties to bargain but could
not require either party to agree to any substantive employment contract provision. Id.
109 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 338. Neither the NLRB
nor the courts have been uniform in stating what should be considered in determining whether a
successor adopted the pre-existing agreement. However, it is possible to identify a number of recur-
ring factors. Id.
1O Id. at 338-339 (emphasis in the original).
I"' Id. at 339.
112 Id. at 340.
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predecessor's" collective bargaining agreement.113 Furthermore, a suc-
cessor which continues to abide by a few specific terms of the pre-existing
agreement may be found to have voluntarily adopted the entire
agreement.'
14
Additionally, "collateral indications that the predecessor's labor
agreement is being assumed may be accorded significant weight by the
[NLRB] and the courts."' 15 In other words, the NLRB accords great
weight to indirect indications of assumption in determining whether the
successor employer adopted the pre-existing agreement. Furthermore,
considerable weight will be given to any proven statements made by the
successor to the union or representatives of the union indicating that the
successor will adopt the pre-existing agreement.
1 16
D. Summary of Labor Law Successorship Doctrine in the United
States From a New Employer's Perspective
When one business entity takes over another, the buyer's concerns
are substantially more complex than the seller's concerns. This is be-
cause the buyer wants to continue to operate the business. It is impera-
tive that the buyer approach the transaction with a "clear and detailed
understanding of how it will operate after the sale." '1 17 If the buyer fails
to do this, it will not be able to make crucially important decisions during
the negotiating process. Furthermore, poor decision-making in the nego-
tiating phase (as well as once the new employer takes over) may limit the
buyer's ability to "restructure the business to conform to its needs and
desires.""'
The Supreme Court cases dealing with this area of law establish
some important guiding principles for new employers. First, a new em-
ployer found to be a successor normally is not bound to adopt the prede-
cessor's collective bargaining agreement when an asset purchase has
occurred. 1 9 Second, a new employer is not obligated to hire its prede-
cessor's employees.' 20 Finally, "[i]f the majority of a new employer's
work force is composed of previously represented employees, and the
113 Id.
114 Id. Such specific terms may include "union dues deductions or pension or health and welfare
contributions." Id.
115 Id. at 341 (emphasis in the original).
116 Id.
117 Fasman & Fischler, supra note 34, at 28.
118 Id.
119 A successor employer is only bound when it is found that it assumed the prior agreement.
120 This is true so long as there is no discrimination for the purpose of avoiding meeting the
"continuity of the work force" test.
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new employer does not make structural changes that alter the basic na-
ture of the business, the new employer will be" forced to bargain with the
pre-existing union."'
VI. TESTS FOR SUCCESSOR STATUS IN CANADA
A. Sale of a Business
The key questions Canadian labor boards ask to determine successor
status are "whether there has been a 'sale' within the extended statutory
definition of the term, and whether what has been sold constitutes a
'business' or 'part of a business'. "122 In order to provide maximum effect
to the statutes' remedial intentions, both the provincial and federal labor
boards adopt a "broad and liberal interpretation of these" statutory pro-
visions.123 Accordingly, "[ilt is the substance rather than the form of the
transaction which is determinative of whether or not the business has
been transferred."' 24
Sham transfers conducted for the purpose of evading collective bar-
gaining obligations are likely to fail. In order to negate this practice,
labor boards will "lift the corporate veil and look at the parties' relation-
ship and intentions."' 25 Thus, it is irrelevant how the new employer as-
sumes control of the business enterprise's operations. If the employing
entity remains intrinsically the same,' 26 there is substantial continuity of
the business and, therefore, a successor obligation. 127
B. Specific Elements in the Test for a Sale, By Jurisdiction
Although the determination of whether a sale of a business occurred
is key to deciding successorship issues, the means of determining whether
such a sale occurred vary by jurisdiction. Because the provinces of Brit-
ish Columbia, Ontario and Quebec contain the vast majority of the Cana-
dian population, special attention will be given to these provinces. In
addition, attention will be given to the federal (or territorial) law.
1. British Columbia
In British Columbia, the labor board surveys and weighs a broad
121 Fasman & Fischler, supra note 34, at 24.




126 This is a vague concept but seems to imply that qualitative factors that make up a business
entity are important. These qualitative factors will be discussed in detail later.
127 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 401-02.
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variety of relevant factors in order to determine whether the sale of a
business occurred. Such factors include "transfers of goodwill, trade-
marks, customer lists and accounts receivable; a covenant not to com-
pete; the presence of the-same employees and the same work; a hiatus in
production; similar clientele; direct contact between vendor and pur-
chaser; and whether the vendor and purchaser have dealt with one an-
other at arm's length."' 28 This is not a complete list and no one factor is
controlling. In essence, the Board must determine "whether enough sig-
nificant components of the business have passed from the predecessor to
the successor, and whether there has been some continuity of the work
operations normally associated with that business." '12 9
Although the British Columbia Board weighs all the factors listed
above (and more), it does place "more emphasis on the transfer of assets
and employees than on continuity of the work performed .... " , 13o This
is in direct contrast to the Quebec Labor Court and the Canada Labor
Board.1 3 ' Nevertheless, whether or not employees transfer with the busi-
ness is not always an important factor. Each case must be decided upon
its own facts and circumstances. If the new business is qualitatively dif-
ferent to such a degree that it would not make sense to preserve the pre-
existing collective bargaining relationship, the Board will not find that a
sale of a business occurred.
132
2. Ontario
The Ontario Labor Board defines a business as the following:
A business is a combination of physical assets and human initiative. In
a sense, it is more than the sum of its parts. It is a dynamic activity, a
'going concern,' something which is 'carried on.' A business is an organiza-
tion about which one has a sense of life, movement, vigor. It is for this
reason that one can meaningfully ascribe organic qualities to it. However
intangible this dynamic quality, it is what distinguishes a 'business' from an
idle collection of assets.
13 3
In determining whether a sale of a business occurred, the Ontario
128 Id. at 404.
129 Id. at 404-05.
130 Id. at 405. However, a transfer of assets alone is not sufficient to establish a sale. An asset
transfer must be accompanied by some continuity of the business. Thus, a transfer of assets coupled
with a "qualitative transformation" of the business enterprise will not establish a sale and, therefore,
no successorship will arise from the transfer. Id. at 434-35.
131 Id. at 405.
132 Id. It must be remembered that the term "sale" as used in this context takes on a special legal
meaning. Whenever a "sale" occurs by the general use of the term, the business will be different.
However, as used in this context, there are specific factors that are used to determine if a "sale" of a
business occurred. Id.
133 Id. at 408. Other provinces do not articulate such a definition.
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Labor Board uses a balancing test similar to that used by the British
Columbia Board.134 However, the Ontario Board adds another factor to
the analysis. In Ontario, a sale of a business must include a transfer of a
"functional economic vehicle." 135 In other words, it is insufficient that
similar job functions are performed unless there is also a" 'transfer from
the predecessor of the essential elements of the business as a block' or the
'transfer of a coherent and severable part of the predecessor's economic
organization'." 136 This requirement indicates that the Ontario Board
may place greater weight on the "commercial nature of the transaction in
the context of the Board's over-all balancing of factors" in determining
whether a sale of a business occurred.
1 37
The Ontario Board retains a unique power. At its discretion, the
Board can refuse to hold a new employer to its collective bargaining obli-
gations even if successorship is found. The Board, however, may only
exercise this discretion if a "substantial change in the nature of the busi-
ness [occurs] within sixty days of the sale." 138 To determine whether a
substantial change occurred, "the Board looks for a fundamental differ-
ence affecting the nature of the work requirements and skills involved in
the business to the extent that continued representation becomes inade-
quate, inappropriate, unreasonable, or unconstitutional."' 139 A mere de-
crease in output, however, is not sufficient to constitute a change in the
characteristic of the business so long as the same product is produced
with the same skills required of employees. 1"
3. Quebec
The Quebec Labor Court appears to take a very broad and liberal
approach to the concept of a sale of a business. The Court looks to see if
"there has been continuity in the framework of operations carried out or
functions exercised."' 41 The Court views these operations and functions
as the true constituents of a business. Furthermore, it is "their transfer
[that] constitutes an 'alienation of an undertaking' under s. 45 of the
Quebec Labour Code, regardless of whether there exists a civil contract
or legal relationship between the predecessor and successor companies or
whether different employees are engaged in performing the same func-
134 Id. at 405.
135 Id. pt 408.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 435.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 402.
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tions." 142 Thus, in Quebec a new employer can become a successor by
merely carrying on the same activities as the predecessor employer.
4. Canada (Federal)143
The Canada Labor Relations Board extends the "Quebec test" for
sale of a business one step further. In addition to requiring a "continuity
in the work and activities carried out by the employees,... the business
sold had to be operated for the same purpose by the purchaser." 1" In
order to give the pertinent labor statute the "dynamic interpretation"
required to achieve the intent of the legislature, "the Board applie[s] this
test on a case-by-case basis to allow for consideration of the individual
and particular characteristics of each separate business." '145
Recently, however, the Board has required a "greater nexus between
the predecessor and successor employers." 1" In requiring a greater
nexus, the Board reasoned that "bargaining rights are not proprietary
rights over work functions."14 7 Thus, in the Board's view, "successor
rights were never intended 'to apply to genuine circumstances of subcon-
tracting, a loss of business to a competitor or where there is a corporate
dissolution'." '148 If this mode of analysis is adopted in general, the Can-
ada Labor Board "approach will come to follow more closely that of
[the] Ontario and British Columbia" labor boards.149 This would indi-
cate a convergence of individual jurisdictional law in this particular area.
5. Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions50 generally favor the balancing mode of analy-
sis used by the Ontario and British Columbia boards." 1 Thus, assuming
the Canada (federal) Board adopts its new approach, with the exception
of Quebec, the balancing mode of analysis appears to be the "all-Cana-
dian" test.152
142 Id.
143 The Canadian Labor Board has jurisdiction over the Canadian territories as well.
144 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 403.





150 Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and
Saskatchewan.
151 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 460.
152 Recall, however, that the emphasized elements can vary by jurisdiction.
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C. Miscellaneous Successorship Issues
1. Partial Sale of a Business
In all Canadian provinces, it is possible for successor obligations to
exist when only part of a business is sold. In order for the sale of a part
of a business to occur such that successor obligations attach to the new
employer, the portion of the business transferred must be "capable of
being defined and identified as a functioning entity that is viable in itself
or sufficiently distinguishable to be severable from the whole."' 53 Thus,
a mere transfer of a group of assets is insufficient to establish a successor
obligation in the purchaser. Furthermore, if the purchaser merely incor-
porates the ancillary elements of the purchased business "into its own
economic organization," then there is no sale of a part of a businesS.
54
2. Hiatuses in Operations
As in the United States, often there is a gap in time between when
the predecessor ceases operations and when the new employer takes over.
To deal with this situation, Canadian labor tribunals "have adopted the
position that they are looking for a continuum in operations rather than
in time."' 55 The focus is on whether the new employer "acquired an
existing business and operating concern-something entirely capable of
surviving a temporary shutdown." 156 The key appears to be the purchase
of an existing business. Thus, questions such as "Did the purchaser buy
an already closed [entity]?" and "Did the purchaser shutdown the [en-
tity] to make renovations?" remain important.157
There is no preset time limit for which a hiatus must last to con-
clude that there is no continuum of the business. Nevertheless, as a gen-
eral matter, a "fourteen- to fifteen-month hiatus in production normally
provides a strong inference that no sale of a business" has occurred. 58
Furthermore, the length of a hiatus needed to break the successorship
obligation will depend upon the type of business involved.' 59 Thus, to
determine whether a hiatus is of sufficient length will require a case-by-
case analysis.
153 G. ADAMS, supra note 10, at 415.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 412.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 412-13.
159 Id. at 413.
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VII. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES' SYSTEM FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN
MNCs
A. A Comparison of Canadian Successorship Doctrine to the
Successorship Doctrine in the United States
1. In General
A general comparison of the successorship doctrines of the United
States and Canada yields both similarities and differences. Beginning
with the similarities, under both doctrines successorship can be found
even where there are no contractual dealings between the predecessor
and the successor. Furthermore, both Quebec and the United States fo-
cus on "job transfer rather than the legal method of disposition." 6 °
However, where the key factor in the United States is whether a majority
of the new employer's workforce is comprised of the predecessor's former
employees (for an action brought under § 8(a) of the NLRA) or whether
a majority of the predecessor's employees are employed by the new em-
ployer (for an action brought under § 301 of the LMRA), this is not the
case in any of the Canadian jurisdictions.
161
This difference in emphasis springs from the difference in focus be-
tween the United States doctrine and the Canadian doctrine. This differ-
ence can be established by analyzing the successorship tests used by each
jurisdiction. The United States appears to be more concerned with the
concept of majority rule than does Canada. If the majority of the employ-
ees in the new work unit were organized workers under the predecessor,
then it follows that a majority of the new workforce supports a union. 162
The "continuity in the character of the business enterprise" test exists
because when major structural changes occur, the inference that the
predecessor's employees still favor union membership breaks down.
Thus, because a majority may not exist, it would be improper to grant
the prior union exclusive representation for workers under the new
employer.
Unlike the United States, Canadian jurisdictions focus on the busi-
ness itself. Most Canadian jurisdictions are more concerned with
whether a business entity or part of a business transfers to a new em-
ployer as opposed to mere asset transferring. The concept of majority
rule appears to be lacking under the various Canadian tests. The provin-
160 Id. at 434.
161 Id.
162 It must be assumed that the predecessor workers favored union membership while working
under the predecessor.
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cial and federal labor tribunals do not direct their primary attention to
the workforce composition of the new employer.
2. By Province
a. British Columbia
The British Columbia test for successorship exhibits some vague
similarities to the successorship test used in the United States. This simi-
larity is found in the British Columbia Labor Board's emphasis on the
transfer of workers from one entity to another. This emphasis is analo-
gous to the "continuity of the workforce" test used by the NLRB and
U.S. courts. However, because the British Columbia test does not focus
on specific majorities "63 like the test used in the United States, the simi-
larity is limited.
b. Ontario
The power retained by the Ontario Labor Board bears a resem-
blance to the "continuity in the character of the enterprise" test used in
the United States. However, the resemblance is only superficial. In the
United States, the "continuity in the character of the enterprise" test is
used to decide if successorship exists. In Ontario, the "substantial
change" test is applied after successorship is found. It is used to nullify
the effects of successorship status and not to determine if successorship
exists. Furthermore, unlike in the United States, in Ontario the test is
discretionary.
c. Quebec
The Quebec test for successorship bears no similarity to the test used
in the United States. First, there are no specific standards on workforce
transfers. Second, although the Quebec test can be loosely analogized to
the "continuity in the character of the enterprise" test used in the United
States, the Quebec test is so broad that it can mean almost anything.
Unlike Quebec, the U.S. test offers specific factors for the NLRB and the
courts to follow.
B. Superiority of the U.S. System
1. Predictability
A new employer in Canada does not have to meet the "continuity of
163 The term "specific majorities" is defined as the majority of the predecessor's workforce work-
ing for the new employer for § 8(a) suits and the majority of the new employer's workforce from the
predecessor for § 301 suits.
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the workforce" test, nor does it have to meet the continuity of the busi-
ness enterprise test. The employer merely has to accept a broad abstract
notion of the predecessor's business. Thus, it appears that it is much eas-
ier to be labeled a successor in Canada. In order to find successorship,
the Canadian labor tribunals have broad discretion to emphasize a vari-
ety of factors.
Under the law of the United States, the threshold test of workforce
composition can create a rebuttable presumption of successorship. In
other words, if a majority of the new employer's workforce is composed
of the predecessor's employees, successorship will be found unless a sig-
nificant structural change in the enterprise occurs from the employees'
perspective."' Although the "continuity in the character of the busi-
ness" test is somewhat vague because it allows the NLRB to pick and
choose which factors to emphasize, the threshold test is exact. A new
employer can determine for itself whether it meets the continuity of the
workforce test. Thus, the U.S. system offers a major advantage to pur-
chasers. A purchaser is better able to predict whether they will be labeled
a successor in the United States rather than in Canada.
2. Consequences of Successor Status
Potential purchasers must also concern themselves with the conse-
quences of being labeled a successor. Once again, from the point of view
of potential purchasers, the U.S. system proves superior to the Canadian
system. Under the Canadian doctrine, once an employer becomes a suc-
cessor it is obligated to accept the pre-existing collective bargaining
agreement.165 Only in Ontario can a successor avoid the obligations of
the agreement by making substantial structural changes in the work
place. 1 66 However, the new employer is still a successor and the Ontario
Labor Board has no duty to excuse the new employer from its obligations
under the agreement. 167
In the United States, a successor employer is less restricted. Unless
the new employer indicates that it will abide by the prior collective bar-
gaining agreement, it is free to bargain for a new agreement. 16' Nor-
mally, the successor employer's only obligation is to bargain with the
pre-existing union. 169 Thus, successorship consequences in the United
States are more flexible than in Canada.
164 See supra notes 66, 89-94 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
167 Id.
168 See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
169 Id.
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3. flexibility
Finally, the U.S. system offers much more flexibility. Because suc-
cessor enterprises in the United States are not bound to the agreement,
they are free to restructure the purchased entity, free to hire a new
workforce, and free "from contractual restrictions that may have played
a large part in the conditions leading to the sale of the business in
question."17
On the other hand, under some circumstances, a successor employer
might like to adopt the pre-existing collective agreement. A no-strike
clause or "union concessions made in an attempt to save a previously
unprofitable enterprise" might make the existing collective agreement at-
tractive to the new employer. 171 This would be especially true where the
successor has no desire to make any major structural changes. 172 In the
United States, a successor is free to decide for itself whether to abide by
the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement or not. In Canada, no
such freedom exists.
VIII. A HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION
The following hypothetical provides an examination of how the suc-
cessorship labor law doctrines of the United States and Canada work in
application. For the purposes of this hypothetical, first assume the
London-based multinational corporation, Eurocom Ltd., decides that it
wants to access the North American market. Furthermore, it wishes to
accomplish this by producing its products for North American distribu-
tion in North America. Also, assume that the Eurocom board of direc-
tors has determined that the best means of achieving this objective is by
taking over the production facilities (through an asset purchase) of a pre-
existing company based in either the United States or Ontario, Canada.
In addition, assume that the plants in both the United States and Canada
each employ two hundred unionized workers. However, Eurocom plans
to introduce significant automation and thereby operate the plant with
only seventy-five employees, fifty of which were brought over from
London or hired from companies other than the predecessor. Finally,
assume that extensive studies have determined that the only significant
difference between taking over a plant in the United States versus a plant
in Canada is Eurocom's potential obligations to these pre-existing collec-
tive bargaining agreements and the pre-existing unions. Thus, Eurocom's
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decision on where to locate will likely turn on its obligations to these pre-
existing collective bargaining agreements and the pre-existing unions.
If Eurocom purchased a plant in the United States, it would not be
labeled a successor employer. Therefore, it would have no obligation to
honor the terms of the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement.
173
Furthermore, it would not even be obligated to bargain with the pre-
existing union. Recall that in the United States, even a successor em-
ployer is not ordinarily obligated under the pre-existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. 174
More specifically, there is no obligation to bargain with the union
under § 8(a) of the NLRA or to arbitrate under § 301 of the LMRA
because neither the "continuity in the workforce" tests nor the "con-
tinuity in the character of the enterprise" test is met. Starting with the
workforce continuity tests, the test under § 8(a) would require more than
fifty-percent (one-half) of the Eurocom workforce 175 to have worked for
the predecessor. 176 Since at least fifty of the seventy-five employees (two-
thirds) will not have worked for the predecessor company, this test is not
met. The § 301 test would require that more than fifty-percent of the
predecessor's employees work for Eurocom. 177 Because the predecessor
employed two-hundred people and at most only twenty-five of those peo-
ple (one-eighth) will be working for Eurocom, this test also is not met.
Even if Eurocom's hiring scheme called for the proportions required
to satisfy the workforce continuity tests, the "continuity in the character
of the enterprise" test would not likely be satisfied. One of the factors
used in determining if this test is met is whether there is a change in the
production process. 178 A very good argument can be made that the addi-
tion of automation to the production process sufficient to cut the number
of jobs by more than sixty-percent constitutes a break in continuity.
179
Thus, because Eurocom is free from any obligations under the pre-ex-
isting employment setting, Eurocom can make the necessary production
and labor force changes 80 which will enable it to make a successful entry
into the North American market.
173 This assumes that Eurocom gave no indication that it would continue to abide by the
agreement.
174 See supra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
175 The fifty-percent requirement refers to the workforce in place at the North American facility
only, not the entire Eurocom workforce.
176 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
179 This argument should prevail. However, no argument is guaranteed to succeed.
180 That is, Eurocom can more effectively implement it automation processes.
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If Eurocom purchased a plant in Ontario, Canada, however, it is
more likely that it will be labeled a successor. The test for successorship
in all Canadian jurisdictions is whether a "sale" of a business has oc-
curred.181 In Ontario, that question is answered by focusing on whether
an "economic vehicle" has been transferred.1 82 This notion, combined
with the Ontario Labor Board's definition of the term "business,
'1 83
makes it very likely that Eurocom would be labeled a successor.
1 84
Eurocom is purchasing a complete production facility, something that
can be classified as a "'going concern' . . which is 'carried on'."
1 85 If
Eurocom is labeled a successor, and there is an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement at the time of the transfer, Eurocom will be bound to
that agreement unless the Labor Board exercises its discretionary power
to nullify the agreement. 86 Thus, Eurocom may be hampered in making
necessary adjustments to the production process and its labor force.
Therefore, Eurocom should choose to purchase the plant located in the
United States.
IX. CONCLUSION
This comment sought to explore and analyze the differences between
labor law successorship doctrine in the United States and the various
Canadian jurisdictions. In doing so, this comment took the perspective of
a foreign MNC seeking access to the North American continent by tak-
ing over a pre-existing entity. Knowledge of potential liability under pre-
existing collective bargaining agreements and to pre-existing unions is an
important factor in deciding where to take over another business entity.
This comment concluded that a foreign multinational corporation
seeking access to the North American market by taking over a pre-ex-
isting business is better off choosing a site in the United States rather
than Canada. The United States offers more flexibility to foreign MNCs
regarding production and labor force changes. Being labeled a successor
in Canada saddles the purchaser with a collective bargaining agreement
181 See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
184 It is possible that the Labor Board will find that the workforce and production changes will be
significant enough not to label Eurocom a successor. However, given the Board's discretionary
power to nullify an employment agreement when structural changes occur, this is the more likely
outcome.
185 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. If there was no agreement at the time of the
transfer, Eurocom would still be obligated to bargain with the union. Id.
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already in existence. Thus, production and labor force changes will be far
more restricted.
The successorship issue is becoming one of increasing importance.
Because we are in an era of "heightened global competition" and of an
increasing number of mergers and acquisitions, successorship issues will
become even more common in the future.1 17 Therefore, a better under-
standing of successorship issues by all parties will greatly facilitate these
types of transactions and minimize monetary and time expenditures on
legal confrontations over such issues. 88
187 H. NORTHRUP, P. MISCRIMARRA, & R. TURNER, supra note 26, at 352.
188 Id.
